Workflows and role-based access control models need to be suitably merged, in order to allow users to perform processes in a correct way, according to the given data access policies and the temporal constraints. Given a mapping between workflow models and simple temporal networks with uncertainty, we discuss a mapping between role temporalities and simple temporal networks, and how to connect the two resulting networks to make explicit who can do what, when. If the connected network is still executable, we show how to compute the set of authorized users for each task. Finally, we define security constraints (to prevent users from doing unauthorized actions) and security constraint propagation rules (to propagate security constraints at runtime). We also provide an algorithm to check whether a set of propagation rules is safe, and we extend an existing execution algorithm to take into account these new security aspects.
INTRODUCTION
Context and motivation. Workflow technology has emerged as a key technology to specify and manage business processes within complex organizations. Recent research has focused on the issues related to workflow temporalities, such as uncertain durations of tasks, temporal constraints between (even non consecutive) tasks, deadlines and so on [7] . As complex tasks need the suitable access to data and systems, role-based access control (RBAC) models play an important part as they both deal with the classical security analysis (concerning authorization inspection, administra- * This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2010-2011 Project "Security Horizons". We thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.
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Thus, in the business process context, RBAC models and workflow models need to be suitably merged, in order to allow users to perform processes in a correct way according to the given data access policies and the temporal constraints.
To properly manage temporal constraints of workflows, solutions have been proposed that are based on a mapping between workflow models and simple temporal constraint networks with uncertainty (STNU) [27] and that allow one to deal with controllability of workflow models. In a nutshell, an STNU, and its corresponding workflow, is controllable if it is always possible to execute the network without violating any constraint no matter what the uncertain durations (of tasks) turn out to be [27] .
Even if both a temporal workflow model and a temporal access control model pass their security analyses successfully, in general we cannot be sure that their composition behaves as we expect. Hence, we need a way to analyze what happens when we put an access control model on top of a workflow model. As a temporal workflow can be translated into an equivalent STNU, if we were able to extend this network to take into consideration the security aspects, we could have some chances of reasoning on their interplay.
Contributions. In this direction, we have merged temporal role-based access control (TRBAC) and temporal workflow models to seamlessly manage temporal constraints when executing tasks together with possible temporal constraints related to the availability of agents able to execute tasks according to their roles. Thus, the first two contributions of this paper are: proposing a mapping of valid intervals of roles into an equivalent simple temporal network, and merging it with the STNU specifying the workflow model.
The enabling times of the roles in TRBAC models are usually specified according to periodic expressions using calendars [21] . We propose the concept of configuration, which corresponds to an STNU containing both the representation of a temporal workflow and the related role-based access model, considering periodic role-enabling intervals within a given, limited time window. A configuration allows us to check if the workflow is executable with respect to the access control model. That is, it allows us to understand if these two models are consistent with each other. If so, then we are able to compute which users belonging to which roles are authorized to execute the tasks.
Moreover, a further contribution is the definition of security constraints (SCs), not directly expressible in rolebased access models, along with their security constraint propagation rules (SCPRs). The former are used to prevent users from doing unauthorized actions (e.g., starting/ending a task) if the current time satisfies the constraint itself, whereas the latter are used to propagate these security constraints depending on what is going on. If different users make different choices, then SCPRs will propagate different SCs. This dynamic approach reacts to observations of the occurring runtime events. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to use temporal networks to model (and enforce) security (policies).
Organization. Section 2 reviews essential background of simple temporal networks (STNs), STNUs, a mapping from workflow models to STNUs, and TRBAC. Section 3 provides a new mapping to translate the enabling intervals of roles of TRBAC into an STN and a connection mapping to connect the workflow STNU to the access control STN. It also shows how to derive the set of authorized users for each time point in these networks. Section 4 introduces a case study also specifying three security policies that are supposed to hold in that context. Section 5 defines SCs and SCPRs to enforce (temporal) security policies when executing a temporal workflow. It also discusses a safeness algorithm for a set of SCPRs. Section 6 discusses how to extend an already existing execution algorithm for STNUs so as to take into account these rules too. Section 7 discusses related work. Section 8 draws conclusions and discusses future work.
The proofs of our results are given, along with further details, in [8] .
BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical foundations of STNs [14] and STNUs [19] , how to map a workflow into an STNU, and role based access models.
Simple Temporal Networks
Definition 1. A Simple Temporal Network (STN) is a pair T , C , where T is a set of time points with continuous domain, and C is a set of constraints of the form X − Y ≤ k with X, Y time points and k ∈ R ∪ {−∞, ∞} [14] .
A Simple Temporal Constraint Satisfaction problem (ST-CP) is the problem of finding a complete assignment of values to the time points in T satisfying all constraints in C [14] .
An STN can also be represented as a directed graph where each node represents a time point of T and each edge X To avoid confusion, hereinafter edges will refer to the edges in the distance graph, whereas (requirement) links will refer to the edges in the STN graph.
To find the ranges of distance values allowed between time points, one can run the all pairs shortest paths algorithm on the distance graph G d [9] . If G d contains a negative cycle, the given STP does not admit solutions, i.e., it is inconsistent. The upper bound of the range between the i th time point and the origin time point Z corresponds to the shortest path from node Z to that node, whereas the lower bound corresponds to the negation of the shortest path in the opposite direction.
Assuming that the origin time point Z is the starting point, to find a complete solution S = {Z = 0, X1 = tX 1 , . . . } for each time point X, we choose a value among those allowed in its range adding the link Z [x,x] − −− → X to the STN (if a link Z → X already exists in the STN graph, then we replace it with the new one). This translates into adding X − Z ≤ x and Z − X ≤ −x to C, which fixes the value for X. To get the new updated ranges for the remaining time points, we propagate the effect of this assignment recomputing the shortest paths on the distance graph containing now the two new constraints Z x − → X and X −x − − → Z. Managing in such way all time points, we obtain a complete solution.
STN with Uncertainty
Definition 2. A Simple Temporal Network with Uncertainty (STNU) extends an STN by adding a set of contingent links [20] . Formally, an STNU is a triple S = T , C, L where:
• L is a set of contingent links of the form (A, x, y, C) (or, equivalently, A [x,y] ==⇒ C in the STNU graph), where the activation point A and the contingent point C are different time points (A ≡ C), x and y are such that 0 < x < y < ∞, and -for each (A, x, y, C) ∈ L, C contains C − A ≤ y and A − C ≤ −x, -if (A1, x1, y1, C1) and (A2, x2, y2, C2) are two distinct contingent links, then C1 ≡ C2, -the contingent time point of a contingent link may play the role of an activation point for another one.
When we are not interested in talking about the range of a link, we simply write A ⇒ C (for contingents) or X → Y (for requirements) omitting [x, y]. As notation, we write A to refer to activation time points, C to contingent time points and X to generic time points. If X is not a contingent time point, then it is also called control time point.
It is easy to see that each STN T , C is also an STNU T , C, L where L = ∅ (i.e., without contingent links). When the network is being executed, the system incrementally assigns a fixed time value to each control time point (i.e., to each non-contingent time point) among those allowed in its range. The system can only observe the occurrence of any contingent Ci, which is not under the control of the system and is however guaranteed to occur in such a way that that Ci − Ai ∈ [xi, yi].
The meaning of contingency can be thought as representing processes that are not under the control of the workflow systems and whose exact duration is unknown but bounded by the range [x, y]. For example, the writing of this paper once started (i.e., once A has been executed) will last at least a minimum amount of time x to allow authors to get a polished version to be submitted and at most y (> x), which in this context is related to the submission deadline. However, the exact moment when the authors will have it finished (and consequently the paper will have been submitted) is unknown at this stage.
In an STNU, we need to move from the concept of consistency to that of controllability, because we now have to deal with "uncertainty", which is by definition out of our control. We must make sure that no execution will violate any constraint. Hence, an STNU is controllable if we are able to execute all control time points satisfying all constraints in C no matter what the durations of the contingent links turn out to be. The rest of this section provides everything we need to define the various types of controllability (see [27] for details).
A situation ω = (d1, . . . , dn) is defined by fixing a chosen duration for each contingent link. Fixing a situation is equivalent to transforming an STNU into an STN as each
, which considers all contingent links as if they were requirement links with a fixed distance. Therefore, an STNU represents an infinite family of STNs (each one projecting a different situation). The space of all situations is represented by Ω. A schedule is a mapping ψ : T → R that assigns a real value to each time point. The space of all schedules (since an STNU can be executed in infinite ways) is represented by Ψ. An execution strategy for S is a mapping σ : Ω → Ψ such that for each situation ω ∈ Ω, σ(ω) is a complete schedule for the time points in T .
Three main kinds of controllability for STNUs have been originally defined in [27] . An STNU is weakly controllable if there exists a viable execution strategy, i.e., if every projection is consistent. An STNU is strongly controllable if there exists a set of viable execution strategies considering all possible projections, where each control time point is assigned the same value by the schedule in all the strategies. An STNU is dynamically controllable if there exists an execution strategy for S that is both viable and dynamic * , where an execution strategy is dynamic * whenever: if the durations of all contingent time points executed before the next time point X are equal in all different situations ω1 and ω2, then the schedule must assign the same value to X in both ω1 and ω2.
Checking the dynamic controllability of an STNU is polynomial. The first algorithm was proposed in [20] and further improvements were given in [17, 19] . The main idea behind the controllability check is that of restricting the execution strategies ruling out those that would squeeze the contingent links, where a contingent link is squeezed if the other constraints imply a tighter lower and/or upper bound for the link. Hereinafter, we will refer to the basic algorithm introduced in [19] for STNU dynamic controllability, avoiding the discussion related to subtle further optimizations. The algorithm takes as input a labeled distance graph built from the STNU according to the following mapping: each requirement link X The algorithm proposed in [19] iteratively checks if the AllMax projection (i.e., the projection in which all contingent links take their maximal duration) is consistent in the STN-sense, where the AllMax projection is the unlabeled distance graph obtained by deleting all lower-case edges and all labels from the upper-case edges (whenever we remove labels from edges or we add new edges, if an edge of the same type already exists in the graph we are operating on, then we usually keep that specifying the tighter constraint with respect to the type of edge). If so, it generates new edges according to suitable edge generation rules given in [19] , until either quiescence (i.e., no further constraints are added or the existing ones are tightened) or the cutoff bound used to make the algorithm strongly polynomial, is reached. A detailed analysis of the execution of this algorithm as well as how the proposed rules work can be found in [19] .
Workflow Modeling
A workflow consists of a set of tasks to be executed in some order to achieve some (business) goal(s). A temporal workflow extends the classical one by taking into account temporal constraints that typically require a lower and an upper bound on the duration of tasks. A temporal workflow also allows one to express relative constraints restricting the allowed time distance between the start or the end of two (not necessarily consecutive) tasks.
In this paper, we only consider structured workflows that can be described by a well-defined grammar and, without loss of generality, we do not consider alternative/choice/conditional paths. Thus, we will focus on the workflow specification where all the specified tasks have to be properly executed. An example of the basic constructs of this grammar is given in Table 1 (Workflow Blocks), where, for each block, the equivalent STNU is depicted on the right of it (Equivalent STNU).
The table shows the basic workflow block task (first row), which can be thought of as a terminal symbol, and then the sequence (second row) and parallel (third row), which can be thought of as non-terminal symbols. The last component (relative constraint) in the fourth row only imposes further temporal constraints between the start/end of two tasks and it has nothing to do with the control flow that is regulated by the grammar. If the workflow model is structured, we will "structure" the corresponding STNU.
Temporal RBAC Models
So far, we have not talked about workflow security, but, as we mentioned above, our aim is to put a temporal RoleBased Access Control (RBAC, [25] ) model on top of a workflow model. As the name says, RBAC models rely on the concept of role, which is different from that of group, as it is a collection of both users and permissions (thus, it acts as an interface between them), rather than a collection of users only [24] . The main components of an RBAC model are:
• Users, Roles, Perm, Sess representing the set of users, roles, permissions and sessions, respectively.
• UA ⊆ Users × Roles and PA ⊆ Roles × Perm representing many to many user-role and permission-role assignment relations, respectively.
• user : Sess → Users and role : Sess → 2
Roles representing functions assigning each session to a single user and to a set of roles, respectively. 
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Corresponding STNU
) is a convention to represent the start (resp., the end) time point of the workflow block WF-Block2 (resp., WF-Block1).
. . .
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WF-Blockn
is a convention to represent the branch (resp., join) component as an internal task.
X is either an activation point (if IS ≡ S) or a contingent point (if IS ≡ E) of some task inside WF-Blocki and Y is the same but with respect to WF-Blockj.
• RH ⊆ Roles × Roles representing a partially ordered role hierarchy relation ≥.
Moreover, in the classical RBAC model a role R is always enabled and can be activated in a session by a user u such that (u, R) ∈ UA. Thus, to deal with the lack of constraints on role enabling and disabling, TRBAC was proposed as a first temporal extension [3] . In this model, a user u can activate a role R provided that both he is authorized to do so and the role is enabled at the time of the request, i.e., R ∈ ST (t), where ST (t) is the set of enabled roles at time t. It follows that the concept of status {active, inactive} of a role is implicitly augmented by adding {enabled, disabled}. Note that, if a role is active (i.e., there is an associated user playing it in some session), then it is also enabled. In general, the vice versa does not hold.
Roles are enabled and disabled according to the content of the role enabling base (REB) R, which mainly consists of periodic events and triggers. A periodic event has the form (I, P, p : E), where: I is a time interval, P is a periodic expression using calendars [21] , and p : E is a prioritized event expression where p is a priority and E has the form enable R or disable R for some R ∈ Roles. For example ([01/01/15,∞], WorkingHours, H:enable director) tells the system to enable (with high priority) the role director from 1 January 2015 onwards, as soon as current time gets to the starting point of each interval spanned by WorkingHours, which is a periodic expression representing all time instants from 9AM to 1PM and from 2PM to 6PM of week days (i.e., from Monday to Friday).
A role trigger has the form B → p : E and its meaning is to fire the periodic event on the right of → whenever all preconditions on the left (the body of the trigger consisting of periodic expressions and role status expressions) become true [3] . A role status expression is either enabled R or ¬enabled R. When firing a role trigger these expressions will be evaluated true or false depending on the status of R at that time. For example, the trigger enable director → enable cashier tells the system to enable the role cashier whenever the role director gets enabled.
In this paper, we consider the fragment of TRBAC consisting of non-conflicting complementary periodic events. For sake of simplicity, we do not consider non-complementary periodic events and conflicting events. Thus, we assume that each interval spanned by the periodic expression is not influenced by other periodic events. Moreover, we do not consider runtime request expressions (and thus individual exceptions) because they allow a security officer to override any execution. We also do not consider role triggers because they may lead to the previous problems. Thus, under these assumptions, priorities will not influence the behavior of the system.
ACCESS-CONTROLLED WORKFLOWS
We first focus on how a controllable workflow can be executed with respect to a given fragment of TRBAC, where the assumptions made at the end of Section 2.4 hold. Then, in Section 3.3 we derive the set of users authorized to execute a time point. In Section 4, we introduce a running example to discuss a possible real application. In Section 5, we introduce security constraints and related propagation rules to enforce security policies at execution time. In Section 6, we discuss how to execute the access-controlled workflow.
Let us start by supposing that we want to understand whether a controllable workflow can be executed with respect to the considered fragment of TRBAC. In such a model, the set Perm = {T1, . . . , Tn} of permissions consists of the workflow tasks, and the interpretation of the role-permission assignment relation (R, T ) ∈ PA is "all users belonging to R are authorized to execute task T ".
As we have already said, roles are enabled during certain time intervals and typically disabled in the complementary. Consequently, since a workflow task T is represented as a contingent link A [x,y] ==⇒ C where there is no control on the contingent point C, the interval where the associated role is enabled is supposed to be at least as large as the maximal duration of the contingent link, i.e., y (otherwise, the workflow would not be consistent with the access control model). Thus, since the workflow and the access control model do not depend on each other, we first need to reduce both models to a common representation to be able to analyze their interplay. To that end, we have chosen to translate the enabling/disabling intervals of roles belonging to the access control model into an equivalent STN to be connected to the STNU representing the workflow model.
We proceed as follows: Section 3.1 introduces a mapping to translate such intervals into an equivalent STN, and then Section 3.2 explains how to connect the resulting STN to the workflow-related STNU.
From Periodic Expressions to STNs
Let Ci be a calendar (Hours, Days, Weeks, . . . ) and Ci Cj be the sub calendar relation (e.g., Days Weeks). A periodic expression has the form
Cn and r ∈ N [21] . The part on the left of specifies the set of starting points (Ois) of the spanned intervals with respect to each calendar (Ci) involved, whereas the part on the right specifies the duration of those intervals in terms of time units (r) in the minimum granularity calendar (C d ). For example, assuming that Monday is the first day of every week, WorkingHours can be formalized as follows: all ·Weeks+{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}·Days+{10, 15}·Hours {4}·Hours .
Periodic expressions implicitly talk about intervals according to the minimum granularity chosen (in this case Hours). The x th hour of the day starts at time instant x−1 and ends at x. For instance, the time instant corresponding to 9AM corresponds to the left bound of the 10 th hour of the day. Likewise, 1PM corresponds to the right bound of the 4th hour of the first interval spanned by WorkingHours starting from the 10 th (i.e., the 13 th hour since this interval contains the 10 th , 11 th , 12 th , and 13 th hour of the day). Every periodic expression can be translated into an equivalent set of simple periodicity constraints. That is, linear repeating intervals of integers along with a gap constraint that limits its applicability as described in [2] (which was inspired by [26] ). Let P be a periodic expression, Periodicity(P ) the number of time units in which P repeats, Granularity(P ) the duration of each spanned interval and Displacement(P ) the set of integers representing the starting points of the spanned intervals. Then, the set of equivalent linear repeating intervals of integers is formally represented by:
where each I P n+1,z = [t1, . . . , t Granularity(P ) ] represents the (n + 1) th interval of integers spanned by the periodic expression P according to the displacement z, and in turn t1, . . . , t Granularity(P ) are generated according to the following equation representing the class of integers t ≡ Periodicity(P ) (y + z − 1) , for every y ∈ {1, . . . , Granularity(P )} once we have fixed z ∈ Displacement(P ) and n ∈ N, where t ≡ k c denotes the set of integers of the form c + kn, ranging from −∞ to +∞ in Z. For each z ∈ Displacement(P ), the set of all start and end points of all intervals spanned by P is computed with respect to y = 1 and y = Granularity(P ), respectively.
For example, consider the first complete week of 2015 only (i.e., that starting on 5 January). WorkingHours translates to t ≡168 (y + z − 1) for y = 1, 2, 3, 4 and z = 106, 111, 130, 135, 154, 159, 178, 183, 202, 207, i.e., from the 10 th and the 15 th hour from Monday to Friday of that week for 4 hours.
To get time intervals of real instants, we modify this translation so that it computes directly such intervals considering only the left and the right bounds. In other words, given P and an interval I = [begin,end] where begin, end are two date expressions identifying a specific granule according to the minimal granularity adopted 1 and 0 ≤ begin ≤ end < ∞, the resulting intervals I P n+1,z can be computed as t ≡168 (y + z − 1) for y = 0, 4 by fixing each time the value of n ∈ N and z as before (where 168 is the number of hours in a week). Depending on the chosen z ∈ Displacement(P ), and for p = Periodicity(P ) and g = Granularity(P ), intervals have thus the form 
where the first line is the computation of linear repeating intervals of integers, and the second one the conversion in intervals of real time instants.
Once we have translated P in a finite number of intervals of real values representing the intervals spanned by P itself, we can generate an equivalent STN representing them. We will refer to this mapping µpt2stn : P ×I → T , C as periodic time to STN. Note that for an STN to be generated it is important that the upper bound of the interval limiting the applicability of the expression P is = ∞. Thus, the resulting STN is represented in Figure 1 . Theorem 1. Given any periodic expression P whose applicability is limited by an interval I whose upper bound is = ∞, the mapping µpt2stn returns an equivalent STN that is (i) consistent and (ii) admits exactly one solution.
The proof is given in [8] . As a convention, when we write P sup n+1,z we mean the start (if sup is S) or the end (if sup is E) point of the (n+1) th (n ∈ N) interval spanned by P choosing the displacement z according to the mapping µpt2stn .
Since the TRBAC periodic events we consider are nonconflicting and complementary, applying the mapping µpt2stn on the bounded periodic expressions associated to the periodic events involving only an "enable R" entails that for each n and z, P S n+1,z → P E n+1,z represents a time interval (of fixed duration) in which the roles associated to this expression in 1 In this case, a date expression has the form dd/mm/yy:hh where hh identifies the (hh) th hour of dd/mm/yy. 2 When we write [dd1/mm 1 /yy 1 , dd2/mm 2 /yy 2 ] we mean that hh1 = 01 whereas hh2 = 24.
the TRBAC role enabling base R are enabled. Furthermore, it also turns out that the complementary intervals have the form [P E n+1,z , P S n+2,z ], where the bounds correspond to the real values given by the scheduler ψ : T → R (which always assigns the same fixed values to these points depending on n and z and P ). The next subsection explains how an STN generated by the mapping µpt2stn restricted to a given upper bound can be connected to the STNU describing the workflow to check if the workflow itself can be executed with respect to the given access control model. We point out that, in general, the mapping µpt2stn returns different STNs depending on the time window we consider (where a time window is, e.g., the first complete day of the current year, or the 2nd complete week of the 3rd month of the next year)
Connecting the Access Control Model
We are now ready to explain how we can put an access control model on top of a workflow by connecting the STN describing the access control model to the STNU describing the workflow. When we connect these two networks we say that the resulting network, which is still an STNU, is a configuration.
Assume a workflow consists of n tasks T1, . . . , Tn corresponding to the n contingent links A1 ⇒ C1, . . . , An ⇒ Cn in the workflow STNU. Also, assume the role R is authorized to execute the task T (i.e., (R, T ) ∈ PA) during the time interval
,z , for some P , n, z and k = P E n+1,z − P S n+1,z . Then, to get a configuration we need to impose that the start of T has to occur after P S n+1,z , whereas the end before P E n+1,z . In other words, role R cannot start T before getting enabled, and cannot end it after getting disabled. A connection mapping µcon : T , C, L × T , C → T , C , L is formally depicted in Table 2 , where on the left the STN representing the access control (above) and the STNU representing the workflow (below) are still not connected, whereas on the right they are. Note that due to lack of space the node Z (zero time point) and the requirement link Z
(for some j = P S n+1,z − Z) have not been shown (but are in [8] ). Also, note that we have added a new label ρ on the links connecting the STN to STNU. In general, this new label ρ = R1R2 . . . Rn consists of a conjunction of roles saying which roles we want to consider during the interval in which they are enabled (as more roles can be enabled during the same interval). Table 2 , then if k < y the resulting STNU is uncontrollable.
The proof is given in [8] .
Deriving Authorized Users
Once we have connected the two networks, we are able to derive new information on which are the users authorized 
to execute the time points. To represent this piece of information, we associate to each time point X ∈ T the set A(X) ⊆ Users of users authorized to execute it as follows.
• For each contingent link A ⇒ C representing task T , the set of authorized users is A(A) = A(C) = {u1 c1 , . . . , un cn }, where c1, . . . cn are security constraints we define in Section 5 and u1, . . . , un are users belonging to all roles Ri such that:
1. (Ri, T ) ∈ PA ∧ (ui, Ri) ∈ UA for j = 1, . . . , n (in the TRBAC model), and 2. Ri belongs to ρ specified on the requirement links connecting P S n+1,z to A and C to P E n+1,z , where P is the associated periodic expression in the periodic event enabling Ri in the REB R.
• For each other time point X different from an activation or a contingent point, A(X) = {wf } which is a special user we consider to advance the execution of "internal tasks" (e.g., branching points).
To be more precise we assume that: (i) wf ∈ Users, (ii) for all R ∈ Roles, (wf , R) ∈ UA, (iii) for all X ≡ A and ≡ C, wf ∈ A(X), and (iv) for all X ≡ A or ≡ C, wf c ∈ A(X).
To conclude this section we extend the form of the classical solution S = {X = tX , . . . } of a network to the new one S = {(ui : X = tX ), . . . } for it to take into account who has executed the time point. The contingency is modeled by the fact that once a task has started we do not know when exactly the user will tell the system that he has finished. Of course, we assume the user to finish within the bounds imposed by the contingent link, otherwise the system raises an exception to cope with the situation.
CASE STUDY
Before we discuss how to enforce security policies at runtime, we introduce a running example.
Workflow
We consider a workflow modeling a round-trip from London to Edinburgh. It starts with the task OutwardJourney in which the train travels from London to Edinburgh. The journey takes from 4 to 5 hours to be completed. After the train has arrived to Edinburgh train station, the ReturnJourney to London starts within 5 hours since 1 hour after arrival. Once the train has returned, before the next round trip starts, a SecurityCheck and a SystemCheck are done in parallel. The first check takes 1 to 2 hours, the second 1 to 3 hours. Figure 2 shows the workflow consisting of 4 tasks, where we have used the graphical components specified in Table 1 (on the left) and decorated each task by a label that specifies the role authorized to carry it out. 
Access Control
The instantiation of the TRBAC is as follows:
• Users = {Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eve, Kate}
The role enabling base R (Figure 3 ) consists of periodic events only. Each line represents a periodic event as described in Section 2.4, where the periodic expressions associated to the roles 3 are:
In other words, these periodic expressions say that the role TrainDriver is enabled every day from 8AM to 8PM, SystemEngineer every day from 3PM to 12AM (midnight) and SecurityEngineer from 3PM until 3AM of the day after. Now consider the time window [01/01/15:01,02/01/15:03] limiting P1, P2 and P3. Role TrainDriver is enabled during [8, 20] , SystemEngineer during [15, 24] and SecurityEngineer during [15, 27] . Figure 4 shows the resulting configuration. 3 We assume R also contains the complementary expressions to disable the roles.
(Temporal) Security Policies
To conclude the case study section we formalize three security policies that are supposed to hold in this context.
Security Policy 1. A user who starts a task ends it too.
Security Policy 2. A user is allowed to execute no more than one task at a time.
Security Policy 3. If the train driver from Edinburgh to London is the same as the one who drove the train from London to Edinburgh, he must rest at least 2 hours before driving again.
We assume that policies 1, 2 and 3 hold for our case study. Without security constraint propagation rules, it is rather easy to note that, if every time we start or end a task we are free to choose any authorized user among those contained in that set, then our example violates all the previous security policies. Therefore, the next section provides a language to define security constraints along with a set of security constraint propagation rules to propagate them when executing.
PROPAGATION OF SECURITY CONST-RAINTS
In Section 3.3, we discussed how to compute the set of authorized users for a time point once we have obtained a configuration (Section 3.2). We now proceed by giving its canonical form as further contribution.
Definition 3. For each time point X belonging to a configuration, the set of authorized users has the canonical form A(X) = {u1 c1 , u2 c2 , . . . , un cn }, where u1, . . . , un are the authorized users and c1, . . . , cn are (temporal) security constraints defined according to the grammar
where t k , k ∈ R ≥0 . c = t k , is a Type-1 security constraint, whereas c = X + k, is Type-2.
Every Type-2 security constraint c = X + k, is reducible to a Type-1 by substituting X with a real value taken from its range, plus k (if k = 0). As an example, let c = X + 1, ≤. Once the value of X becomes known, say the scheduler executes it at time 3 (ψ(X) = 3), we substitute it for X also adding the constant k = 1. After that, the Type-2 security constraint reduces to the Type-1 c = 4, ≤.
The main idea behind a security constraint is that of blocking the associated user in order to prevent him from executing some time point if a security policy is violated. Definition 4. We define interpretation of security constraints with respect to current time t as follows:
A user u is blocked for the time point X if u c ∈ A(X), and current time t |= c.
It is clear from the context that 1-6 regard Type-1 security constraints, whereas 7-12 regard the Type-2. The interpretation of the first group with respect to the chosen operator substantially states that those constraints will be true if current time t is greater than the value specified (1), less than it (2), greater than or equal to it (3), less than or equal to it (4), equal to it (5), or different from it (6). Instead, that of the second group (Type-2) is a little bit subtle since the value of time point specified in it is still unknown.
The interpretation with respect to the chosen operator states that, since X will be executed in the future and is thus yet unknown, the Type-2 constraint is interpreted false (7), true (8) , false (9), true (10), false (11) and true (12) . When X executes the Type-2 constraint is reduced to a Type-1 and interpreted accordingly.
As an example, consider c = X + 3, >. The current time satisfies this constraint iff it is greater than X + 3, where the value of X is still unknown. Therefore, at current time t this constraint is false.
Furthermore, when X executes, this constraint remains false for 3 other time units. Now consider the complementary case c = X + 3, ≤. The current time satisfies c iff it is less than or equal to X + 3, where the value of X is still unknown. Even if X is still unknown, this constraint at time t is trivially true since current time is of course less than (or equal to) some other value in the future plus some positive constant. Furthermore, when X executes, this constraint remains true for 3 other time units. Similar explanations apply to the other Type-2 constraints.
Security constraint propagation rules say how security constraints propagate when executing. , where X is a time point, c a security constraint, Y a set of time points, and is either = or =.
The semantics of an SCPR says that when X is executed, the security constraint c has to be set to all users in A(Y ) (Y ∈ Y) equal to (if is =) or different from (if is =) the user who executed X.
From Security Policies to SCPRs
We can use SCPRs as a means to embed the (temporal) security policies we want to hold. We exemplify this at hand of the three security policies defined in Section 4.3 by sketching a few constructs of an high-level language to define security policies for the workflow we are currently designing. This language allows Security Officers to specify security policies in an easier way without even mentioning time points. Then, an intermediate step is that of generating a set S of SCPRs starting from the constructs of this language for the system to be able to do a safeness check first and propagate SCs while executing.
We know that by means of the mapping µpt2stn each task T is represented as a contingent link describing its start and end point. Thus we need constructs such as start(T ) end end(T ) to model these aspects.
To express conditions on who did what, we envision to have primitives like hasExecuted(u, T ), hasStarted(u, T ), hasEnded(u, T ) as binary predicates modeling the fact that user u has executed/started/ended task T . Instead, to model who is not allowed to start or end a task we envision to have primitives cannotStart(u, T ), cannotEnd(u, T ) as well as clauses such as u1 = u2 and u1 = u2 (resp. T1 = T2 and T1 = T2) to intend the same or a different user (resp. task).
This language also needs to quantify over the sets of authorized users and tasks to formalize properties such as for all ... [in ...] other than conditional blocks such as if ... then ... [else ...]. Note that since we are considering structured workflows, we are able to formalize statements such as "for all tasks in the first parallel block".
Last but not least, we need "temporal constructs" such as before k after end(T ) to model security properties such as Temporal Separation of Duties (TSoD).
Security Policy 1 requires that an authorized user who starts a task ends it too. In the high-level language we expect to formalize it this way:
This rule is translated in n SCPRs having the form:
where n is the number of tasks which the workflow consists of. In our case study is translated to 4 rules (since the workflow of Figure 2 consists of 4 tasks):
That is, every time an authorized user u executes an activation point A, the system sets the constraint C, ≤ to all users u ∈ A(C) where u = u. Those users will be blocked until t |= C, ≤ (i.e., until C is executed). Security Policy 2 requires that an authorized user is allowed to execute one task at a time.
ri : Ai, Ci, ≤ , {Aj}, = where i = j and n is the number of tasks in the considered parallel block (because we model all possible cases). In our case study is translated to:
In the case study introduced in Section 4 there is only one parallel block which consists of tasks T3, T4 (Figure 2 ) or equivalently contingent links A3 ⇒ C3, A4 ⇒ C4 (Figure 4) . Therefore, if a user can execute both tasks (where the execution order of T3, T4 is not well defined), we must prevent him from executing the other until the current is not finished. Relying on r1 it is enough to set the constraint (i.e., to block the user) only on the activation points A3, A4 depending on which task executes first. Security Policy 3 requires that if the same authorized user executes T1 and T2, then between the end of T1 and the start 
Figure 4: STNU equivalent to the access-controlled workflow depicted in Figure 2 . Users u1, u2, u3, u4, u5 represent Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eve, and Kate, respectively.
of T2 at least 2 hours have to elapse.
This rule is translated in a single SCPR having the form:
where i = j. In our case study is translated to:
The same reason of r5, r6 (i.e., relying on r1) applies here to avoid writing a redundant C2 in r7's Y. Separation of Duties (SoD) requires that the same user ought not be able to carry out two sensitive tasks in the same execution. Temporal Separation of Duties (TSoD) is an extension of SoD that allows the same user to do so, but only if a further temporal constraints is satisfied. In our example, the train driver can bring the train back to London as long as he has rested at least 2 hours (the further temporal constraint). Furthermore, imposing this constraint at workflow level (e.g., tightening the STNU by means of a re-
− −−−− → A2, for some > 0) would be wrong. Indeed, it would prevent all train drivers different from the one who drove the train during the outward journey from driving the train in the return journey as soon as possible since the arrival at Edinburgh station. That is, exactly after 1 hour considering that we have the constraint (Figure 4 ).
Safeness of a set of SCPRs
We are left to specify the notion of safeness for a set S of SCPRs. We recall that an STNU is executed incrementally [18] . To do that, we must define (i) conflicting rules, and (ii) an algorithm to check if a set S of SCPRs does not contain any pair of conflicting rules. We proceed by providing the definition of conflicting rules and then a safeness check algorithm. Definition 6. Two SCPRs r1 = X1, c1, Y1, 1 and r2 = X2, c2, Y2, 2 are in conflict iff the following four conditions hold all together: (1) X1 = X2, (2) c1 = c2, (3) Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅, and (4) 1 = 2. As an example, the following two SCPRs are conflicting:
Algorithm 1
Rule r1 says that when X has been executed by u ∈ A(X) the security constraint Y +2, ≤ has to be set for all users different from u belonging to the sets A(Z) and A(V ), whereas r2 says that the complementary constraint (Y, >) has to be set, again, for all users different from u belonging to A(W ) and A(Z). These two rules are conflicting since the four conditions hold all together:
{Z, V } ∩ {W, Z} = {Z} = ∅, and (4) both are =. In other words, they are trying to set at the same time a different constraint for the same users belonging to A(Z).
It is quite easy now to see that the set S = {r1, . . . , r7} containing the seven SCPRs translating the three security policies of our case study is safe, since there does not exist any pair of conflicting rules. A first brute-force procedure to check the safeness of a set S = {r1, . . . , rn} of SCPRs is given in Algorithm 1, which takes as input S and tests the four conditions of Definition 6 for all different pairs of rules ri, rj ∈ S. The algorithm runs exactly in Θ(|S| 2 ).
WORKFLOW EXECUTION
In order to propagate security constraints when the workflow is being executed we are left to do one thing: to specify how SCPRs are taken into account at runtime. To do so, we extend the STNU execution algorithm in [18] for it to take as input also a (safe) set of SCPRs that shall be evaluated each time a time point is executed. If the executed time point matches the guard of some rules, then the constraints in them have to be set (thus propagated) before 
5:
Wait for some time point live and enabled X ∈ A
6:
Arbitrary pick a live and enable time point X ∈ A
7:
Arbitrary pick u c ∈ A(X) such that t |= c 8:
Propagate all X i , c i , Y i , i ∈ S s.t. X = X i
10:
Advance t propagating all temporal constraints
11:
end while 12: end procedure the execution continues according to all we have said so far (Algorithm 2).
Now it is time to be more concrete by writing down how the state of the system evolves during the execution. Of course, there are infinite different ways of executing a workflow since time is dense; consequently, each range [x, y] where x = y (e.g., those belonging to contingent links) consists of infinite points. For instance, in our case study we have chosen a possible execution with the only purpose of showing how security constraints propagate. The execution is given in Table 3 (in the appendix), where cells in bold-face point out the security constraint(s) being applied.
RELATED WORK
Related work on defining, validating, and enforcing access control policies in workflow contexts can be grouped in four main areas: (i) access control and workflow models, (ii) authorization constraints, (iii) planning, and (iv) run-time execution.
RBAC models [25] are the default choice for many organizations that need to balance security with flexibility. Classical RBAC models are however unable to deal with security policies at user level, such as separation or binding of duties.
In [5] , Bertino et al. give a language for defining authorization constraints on role and user assignment to tasks in a workflow. They also provide algorithms for constraint consistency check and task assignment. This proposal assumes the workflow to verify a total order on tasks (i.e., no parallel tasks are allowed). Furthermore, temporal constraints are not investigated.
The Temporal Authorization Base model described in [4] is able to enforce authorization constraints in heterogeneous distributed systems. It allows users to assign periodic authorizations to other users on sets of objects. This model is quite expressive. In order to use it in a workflow context, we conjecture that it would be required to restrict access modes to execute and constrain objects to be tasks. However, a thorough investigation is needed, as in our context we also need to deal with the temporal aspects related to workflows.
A number of proposals (Wang and Li in [28] and Crampton et al. in [6, 10, 11, 12, 13] , to name a few) have addressed the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) and the resiliency problem. WSP is the problem of assigning tasks to users so that the execution of the access controlled workflow is guaranteed to reach the end, when dealing with authorization constraints that might prevent some user from doing some action in the future. In general, solving WSP requires exponential time, but some of the cited approaches proved (by using parameterized complexity and kernelization) that for some workflow instances (those where the number of users equals the number of tasks) the WSP can be solved in polynomial time. In our work, we have not dealt with WSP yet, but only with the satisfaction of temporal constraints. As for current and future work, we are trying to extend our approach to deal with WSP, by refining the classical STNU DC-check to take into account authorization constraints as well. If an STNU passes this check, then we can also generate an execution strategy to execute the workflow (planning phase), being guaranteed to always get to the end by satisfying all constraints.
On the other hand, the resiliency problem faces the issue of how to deal with the execution of plans if some authorized users become unavailable, when the workflow is being executed. To the best of our knowledge, no solution to the WSP and to the resiliency problems using temporal networks has been proposed so far and the related temporal aspects of such problems deserve further attention.
Finally, in [22] , Paci et al. proposed proposed RBAC-WS-BPEL, a role-based access control model for the web services business process execution language WS-BPEL. The language is based on XML and does not deal with temporal constraints, which makes it unsuitable for our context.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we focused on the issue of managing in a seamless way role-based access control mechanisms in temporal workflows, where temporal aspects are both in the access control model and in the workflow model. We based our approach on temporal constraint networks. To the best of our knowledge, all of the existing approaches are unsuitable to deal with a workflow having both temporal constraints related to the execution control model and in the access control model.
We have provided mappings to translate a workflow into an equivalent STNU and a time window of TRBAC into an equivalent STN to be connected to STNU describing the workflow. This allowed us to answer the question about whether or not the resulting configuration is executable. Then, we have derived for each time point the set of authorized users and defined security constraints along with their propagation rules in order to set, update and propagate security constraints also discussing safeness and execution issues.
We view this paper as a first step of a more general research work, where we will consider and face the following research directions: considering conditional STNUs [15] in order to augment expressiveness to model different workflow paths; allowing the combination of temporal security constraints such as u c1 ∧ c2 or u ¬c to express security policies such as "(not) during"; defining a high-level security policy language; and considering the temporal workflow satisfiability problem (TWSP) (i.e., controllability with respect to security), to do an automated validation of security policies with respect to different possible temporal configurations and user assignments. At 8 o'clock Bob (u2), who is a train driver, starts the outward journey from London to Edinburgh. Rule r1 (enforcing Security Policy 1) constrains Bob to be the only user to end the task (i.e. to execute C1) between 12PM and 1PM by applying the security constraint C1, ≤ for all users apart from him in A(C1) (row 1). Suppose the outward journey takes 4 hours. Thus, Bob tells the system the train has arrived at Edinburgh station at midday (row 2). Furthermore, rule r7 (enforcing Security Policy 3) prevents Bob from starting the return journey before current time does not pass 2 o'clock by applying the security constraint 14, ≤ 4 for him in A(A2) (again, row 2). Meanwhile at 3 o'clock the system starts both P S 2 and P S 3 enabling R2 and R3, respectively without applying any security constraint. Now let us say that Bob starts the return journey at 3 o'clock. Rule r1 constrains him to finish the journey between 7PM and 8PM. That is, C2, ≤ is applied for all users apart from him in A(C2) (row 3). Assume this time the return journey takes its maximal duration (5 hours). Since there is no security policy which says something upon the arrival of the return journey there is not any rule r whose guard is C2 either (row 4). The system also disables R1 by executing P E 1 at the same time. Table 3 : Example of execution of the case study. A(Ai) (resp., A(Ci) is the set of users authorized to start (resp., end) task Ti. The first column shows when which user has executed which time point.
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Suppose now that Charlie (u3) starts the system check at 9PM. Rule r5 (enforcing Security Policy 2) prevents him from executing the security check until he has finished the current task by applying C3, ≤ for him in A(A4) (row 5). The motivation is that Charlie is both a System and a Security Engineer, thereby he is authorized to execute both tasks. Furthermore, r3 fires too by constraining Charlie to be the only one authorized to end the task applying C3, ≤ for all users apart from him in A(C3) (again, row 5).
Assume now that while system check is being executed, Eve (u4) starts the security check at 10PM. Rule r6 does the same of r5 but with respect to Eve and task SystemCheck. However, since Eve is not a System Engineer (consequently u4 ∈ A(A3)) this rules has no effect on the state of the system (row 6). Instead, r4 applies as usual by setting C4, ≤ for all users apart from Eve in A(C4) (again, row 6). Now suppose Charlie and Eve terminate the tasks they are executing at 11PM and at 1AM (of the day after), respectively (rows 7 and 8). What happens next is that no security constraint is applied (because there are no rules whose guards contain C3 or C4) and the system disables R3 at midnight (by executing P E 2 ) and R4 at 3AM of the day after (by executing P E 3 ). Finally, as for the branch block, the system decides the duration of the join block is instantaneous and starts after 1 hour since the last task (SecurityCheck in this strategy) has terminated, i.e., the system executes E S and E E at 1AM of the day after without applying any security constraint.
